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ABSTRACT
Conﬁrmation is a widespread tendency to seek, use, interpret or remember
information in such a way as to corroborate one’s hypothesis. We review
various conceptions of conﬁrmation and classify them as a function of whether
they depict this phenomenon as a cognitive failure, a form of motivational
prioritisation, or a pragmatic strategy. Then, we note that such a systematic
and pervasive phenomenon must be a central mechanism of human activity
serving an important and speciﬁc social function. We propose that conﬁrma-
tion is an adaptive mechanism that serves the function of coping with com-
petitive situations. This general proposition is broken down into three
implications: Conﬁrmation occurs to a larger extent (1) when there is competi-
tion, (2) when competition is threatening, (3) when competition threatens
one’s feelings of competence. A research programme is reported to illustrate
each of these implications.
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Testing ideas, beliefs and hypotheses by gathering evidence in physical or
social reality is a major feature of everyday life. Citizens look for informa-
tion that is likely to enlighten their political choices, physicians check their
diagnoses against observable symptoms, and scientists test their hypotheses
by collecting relevant data. Notwithstanding the diversity of actors, goals,
and tests depicted in the above examples, a common phenomenon consis-
tently appears from a sizable body of literature in cognitive and social
psychology: People display a tendency to conﬁrm their hypotheses. This
phenomenon can be deﬁned as the tendency to “search for, interpret or
remember information in such a way that the corroboration of a hypothesis
becomes likely, independent of its truth” (Oswald & Grosjean, 2004, p. 93).
Interestingly, such a deﬁnition points out that, in the process of testing their
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hypotheses in a conﬁrmatory manner, citizens may end up voting for a
candidate that is not as honest as they believed, physicians may recommend
a treatment that is inappropriate for their patient, and scientists may reach
conclusions that are not sustained by solid evidence. It then appears that
the consistency and potential for harm of such a phenomenon are conspic-
uous, and indeed several lines of research have attempted to account for its
occurrence.
In this article, we present various conceptions and explanations, and
classify them as a function of whether they depict conﬁrmation as a
cognitive failure, a form of motivational prioritisation, or a pragmatic
strategy. Then, we argue that conﬁrmation has a speciﬁc social function,
and propose that it is a fundamental mechanism that helps coping with
competition. To corroborate this proposition, we present evidence from
older and more recent research that tackled the question of the social
determinants of reasoning.
Conﬁrmation and its interpretations
The advent of the cognitive revolution in psychology (see Miller, 2003)
focused the attention of psychological scientists on the cognitive processes
responsible for behaviour, among which appear both reasoning and
hypothesis testing (e.g., Gardner, 2008). Hypothesis testing, in particular,
has been described as a fundamental process in human activity, as it
intervenes for people from all walks of life, from lay inferences used to
understand life events (e.g., Kruglanski, 1980) to formal reasoning in aca-
demic and scientiﬁc practices (e.g., Mitroﬀ, 1974). However, as mentioned
above, research has highlighted a systematic tendency towards conﬁrmation
in hypothesis testing (Caverni, Fabre, & Gonzales, 1990). But, what is the
problem with conﬁrmation and why is it so interesting to psychologists?
Let us consider one of the classic studies of hypothesis testing. In his
experiment, Wason (1960) asked his participants to guess the rule of
composition of the 2-4-6 number string. Established by the experimenter,
the rule was in this case “increasing numbers”. The participants must think
of a rule, that is, formulate a hypothesis, and propose triads of numbers to
the experimenter, who informs them in return whether they are compatible
with the rule to be discovered or not. Once the participants are convinced
they have the correct rule, they communicate it to the experimenter who
tells them if it is indeed the correct rule. This study revealed that partici-
pants most often propose number triads compatible with their hypothesis
(e.g., 8-10-12 for the hypothesis “even numbers increasing in intervals of
two“), believing that they can conclude that their hypothesis is correct if the
experimenter judges their triad compatible with the rule to be discovered.
However, the rule to be discovered is very general (“increasing numbers”),
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while the participants formulate hypotheses by trying to use all the infor-
mation contained in the triad 2-4-6 (e.g., “even numbers increasing in
intervals of two”); thus, when they propose conﬁrmatory triads of their
hypothesis (e.g., 8-10-12), participants always receive the answer that their
triad is compatible (8-10-12 are indeed increasing numbers), but that they
did not ﬁnd the correct rule. It is by proposing a triad that is not compatible
with their hypothesis (e.g., 3-5-11), thus by using disconﬁrmation, that
participants can discover that the triad is nonetheless compatible (they
are increasing numbers, but neither even, nor increasing in intervals of
two), infer that the rule must, therefore, be more general than the one they
have imagined, and approach the correct answer.
Thus, the problem with conﬁrmation is that people systematically use a
hypothesis-testing strategy that seems inadequate: To check the validity of
their hypothesis using examples (triads) that describe it, while the most
diagnostic strategy would be to test the plausibility of examples incompa-
tible with this hypothesis. Conﬁrmation is then interesting to psychologists
because it is a phenomenon that questions human rationality. Indeed, it has
been pointed out that laypeople do not reason according to the rules of
formal logic, and not only in hypothesis testing (for a discussion, see
Legrenzi & Legrenzi, 1991).
Since the early work pioneered by Wason (1960), the tendency to use
conﬁrmation has been found in many domains of human cognition, from
inductive reasoning (e.g., Gorman & Gorman, 1984; Mynatt, Doherty, &
Tweney, 1977), to deductive reasoning (Evans, 1982; Wason, 1966).
Moreover, the systematic use of conﬁrmation was observed in several studies
on the search for information about expectancies, from selecting and remem-
bering information about one’s personality (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss,
1973) to selecting information and displaying behaviours as a function of
person perception (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978; see also Snyder, 1981), from
conﬁrmation of stereotypes (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983) to self-fulﬁlling
prophecies (Jussim, 1986). Finally, a tendency to conﬁrmation was found
in countless other tasks and situations (see Evans, 1989; Holyoak & Spellman,
1993; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), even in theory-building in psychology
(e.g., Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986).
Three remarks are needed at this point to fully understand the nature of
the conﬁrmation phenomenon. First, conﬁrmation can be due to a number
of cognitive, motivational and social factors – as we will see in the following
sections – but it is present in human inference at a certain baseline for
sampling reasons. The sampling approach (Fiedler, 1996) explains that
many judgment biases are due to the mere sampling of information. For
example, self-other biases – the more positive evaluation of oneself as
compared with others – can be explained by the amount of positive
information about the self. We all know more about ourselves than about
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others, which makes self-related observations more readily available than
other-related information. As positive behaviours are more frequent than
negative behaviours, aggregation of information should result in extracting
positivity to a larger extent for the self than for others. In other words, no
biased processes, either cognitive or motivational, are necessary to explain
the emergence of judgment biases, although of course, they may intervene
to increase the prevalence of a phenomenon above the baseline. This
approach implies that conﬁrmation shares the emergent property of
being sensitive to sampling with many other phenomena (see also Fiedler,
2008; Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999; Le Mens & Denrell, 2011), and that
the explanatory mechanisms that we are going to review intervene in
addition to this general process.
Second, conﬁrmation does not always correspond to a suboptimal
hypothesis-testing strategy. Laughlin, VanderStoep, and Hollingshead
(1991), for example, pointed out that conﬁrming evidence may be particu-
larly useful during hypothesis formation, as it helps evaluate the plausibility
of a hypothesis. Moreover, Klayman and Ha (1987) argued that many
phenomena that are sometimes referred to as “conﬁrmation bias” are in
fact a form of what they call “positive test strategy”, i.e., “a tendency to test
cases that are expected (or known) to have the property of interest rather
than those expected (or known) to lack that property” (p. 211).
Conﬁrmation should be used to refer to the tendency to retain a favoured
hypothesis (Klayman, 1995). Positive test strategy can be useful in rule
learning, concept identiﬁcation and in environments where feedback is
probabilistic. For instance, one may be concerned with a rare phenomenon
(say, a disease) and formulate a hypothesis that corresponds to such a base
rate; in this case, it is reasonable to conduct the test where one expects the
phenomenon to occur (among people believed to be at risk) rather than the
opposite. However, these authors also note that positive test strategy may
lead to suboptimal results as it may conceal important falsifying instances,
generate superﬂuous tests of necessity and overlook important tests of
suﬃciency (see also Klayman & Ha, 1989)
Third, conﬁrmation is not a uniform phenomenon. We have already
noted that it may emerge in several domains of human cognition, but it
should also be noted that there are several sorts of conﬁrmation, at several
stages of hypothesis development. As argued by Klayman (1995), conﬁrma-
tion can consist in (a) overconﬁdence in an initial belief, (b) searching for
evidence in the data in a way that favours one’s hypothesis, (c) interpreting
available information so as to favour one’s hypothesis, (d) insuﬃciently
revising one’s conﬁdence in the initial hypothesis, and (e) failing to gen-
erate new hypotheses when doubts arise about one’s hypothesis. However,
this heterogeneity notwithstanding, “it is nevertheless possible to discern a
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general direction, namely a general tendency for people to believe too much
in their favoured hypothesis” (Klayman, 1995, p. 385).
Several explanations have been proposed for this systematic appearance
of conﬁrmation, and there is no point in separating explanations that have
arisen in the cognitive psychology literature from those that were provided
by social psychologists. We decided instead to organise the main trends of
this literature in terms of the mechanisms used to account for the emer-
gence of conﬁrmation, namely cognitive failure, motivational prioritisation,
or a pragmatic strategy.
Conﬁrmation as cognitive failure
The ﬁrst category of explanations views conﬁrmation as a failure of the
cognitive system. Conﬁrmation would be related to the existence of a more
general positivity bias that is thought to be due to “cognitive diﬃculty in
thinking about information that is essentially negative in its design” (Evans,
1989, p. 63). Accordingly, “[s]ubjects conﬁrm, not because they want to, but
because they cannot think of the way to falsify” (p. 42). In line with this
idea, other authors consider that conﬁrmation stems from a bias in infor-
mation processing: Individuals focus on the ﬁrst plausible hypothesis and
do not consider the alternatives that could lead to the rule to be found
(McDonald, 1990).
Along the same lines, several authors consider that the traditional tasks
proposed to study reasoning – as for instance the 2–4-6 task presented
above (Wason, 1960) – are too “diﬃcult”, i.e., they do not correspond to
any psychological experience in real life. This trend considers that, on a
daily basis, individuals do not possess a “mental logic” (Rips, 1994) that
would allow them to solve a formal task as a logician would do (Legrenzi &
Legrenzi, 1991). By mental logic, we mean the capacity to use the rules of
logic, without having studied them, as proposed in the Piagetian tradition
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). A similar criticism has been addressed by
Oaksford and Chater (1994), who argued that analyses of human reasoning
should move from normative to adaptive rationality (Anderson, 1990); in
other words, rationality should be evaluated against the ability to adapt to
one’s environment and not against the rules of logic (see also Chater &
Oaksford, 1999; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007).
The issue of diﬃculty has been addressed by research showing that the
resolution of these problems can be improved if one articulates the task
with a social dimension, in a sort of “social marking” (Doise & Mugny,
1984). The ﬁrst attempts in this direction consisted in associating a social
connotation to Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1966). In the original,
abstract version of this task, participants were given four cards with letters
on one side and numbers on the other side. Two cards were turned letter up
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and two number up (e.g., A-D-3–7). The participants were given a rule that
applied to these cards: “if there is an A on one side of the card, then there is
a 3 on the other side of the card”, and asked to decide which cards, and only
which cards, would need to be turned over in order to check whether the
rule is true or false. This task aimed at studying how people test hypotheses
of the type “if p, then q”, and the logically correct answer is that only two
cards should be turned over: A (if there is not a 3 on the other side, the rule
is false) and 7 (if there is an A on the other side, the rule is false). Turning
over the D card is useless, as the rule does not mention this letter, as is
turning over the 3 card, as the rule does not prevent 3 from having a D on
the other side. However, most participants of the original and follow-up
experiments fail to select the correct cards, and instead select A and 3. This
corresponds to a conﬁrmation bias, in that participants look for cards
potentially consistent with the rule (cards that should have an A and a 3),
and fail to select the card that might disconﬁrm the rule (the 7 card), as
noted by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972).
The original selection task was then transformed by Griggs and Cox
(1982) into the test of the hypothesis “if a person drinks beer, then he must
be over eighteen” (which was a rule known to the participants). Falsiﬁcation
no longer corresponds here to the search for an abstract counter-example
“not-q”, but to the search for a breach in a social norm like “the person is
under eighteen years old and drinks beer” (a case known and frequently
observed by participants). And, indeed, the proportion of correct answers
rose dramatically in this version. The perspective of Griggs and Cox (1982)
is then to use social marking as a facilitator: Social experience is easily
accessible through memory and people can actually apply a known situa-
tion to solve such a diﬃcult task. Likewise, Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and
Legrenzi (1972) found a correct solution rate of 87.5% (instead of the usual
percentage of just over 10%) by embedding the selection task in a known
postal control procedure.
Mental model theory oﬀers a possible explanation for the diﬃculty in
falsifying hypotheses (Johnson-Laird, 1983). When reasoning, people build
mental models of the task at hand. However, due to limited cognitive
resources, reasoners only build one mental model at a time (Legrenzi,
Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 1993). This is a problem for the ability to use
disconﬁrmation, as such a strategy requires the problem-solving participant
to imagine a focal hypothesis and, at the same time, an alternative one; this
requires participants to build two mental models. Thus, conﬁrmation would
be easier than disconﬁrmation because it requires them to build only one
model.
Neglect of alternative hypotheses has also been identiﬁed as a central
problem in other lines of research (e.g., Trope & Mackie, 1987), in particular
to the extent that it might produce a pseudodiagnosticity eﬀect.
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Pseudodiagnosticity is the tendency to seek out conﬁrmatory information
consistent with the ﬁrst available hypothesis, without envisioning alternative
hypotheses. It is a misleading mechanism because it gives the impression that
one is testing a hypothesis with relevant information, while one is, in fact,
ignoring better options aﬀorded by alternative hypotheses (e.g., Beyth-Marom
& Fischhoﬀ, 1983; Maggi, Butera, Legrenzi, & Mugny, 1998).
Although the research reviewed in this section suggests that conﬁrma-
tion is related to the inability to reason like logicians, some other research
called this claim into question by showing that even extremely competent
and educated people use conﬁrmation when testing their hypotheses.
Besides the anecdote about Albert Einstein, who allegedly declared that
“he would reject the data before he would reject relativity theory”
(Mahoney, 1979, p. 359), research on cognitive processes among scientists
has shown that experts appear to be just as likely as laypeople to fall prey of
conﬁrmation (Mahoney, 1976). For instance, Mitroﬀ (1974), who for 3
years studied a group of scientists working on the Apollo mission, con-
cluded that “scientists were eﬀectively involved with their ideas, were
reluctant to part with them, and did everything in their power to conﬁrm
them” (p. 586). In sum, conﬁrmation may be related to the diﬃculty
inherent to hypothesis testing, and in particular hypothesis falsiﬁcation,
but this explanation cannot account for the pervasiveness of the phenom-
enon, even among scientists who have received formal training in logic and
mathematics.
Conﬁrmation as motivational prioritisation
The second category of explanations relies on the idea that the human
motivational system prioritises motives in such a way that epistemic con-
cerns related to truth and accuracy do not appear among one’s priorities.
For instance, people could be motivated to verify rather than falsify their
hypotheses for self-consistency-related reasons, pertaining to “vanity and
maintenance of the beliefs structure” (Evans, 1982, p. 42). A large number
of studies have attempted to demonstrate the motivational hypothesis by
studying how the prevalence of conﬁrmation can be reduced by instructions
that show the usefulness of disconﬁrmation, and therefore the participant’s
interest in using it. These studies have yielded rather variable results: While
some showed the usefulness of the instructions (e.g., Tweney et al., 1980;
Experiment 4, Gorman & Gorman, 1984), others showed no improvement
in the resolution of the task following disconﬁrmation instructions (e.g.,
Mynatt et al., 1977).
The theory of lay epistemics developed by Kruglanski (1980, 1989,
1990) presents a more comprehensive account of why people stop testing
their hypotheses at some point and may be content with conﬁrmatory
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evidence. This theory postulates that knowledge is formed in two phases,
during which hypotheses are ﬁrst generated and then evaluated
(Kruglanski, 1990); evaluation can then lead to a new generation of
hypotheses. Beyond the mechanisms of generation and evaluation, the
theory of lay epistemics is particularly concerned with the motivational
factors that determine both the initialisation and the termination of such
processes. These factors depend on epistemic motivations, that is, the
“motivations toward knowledge as object” (Kruglanski, 1990, p. 335) that
are organised according to two variables. The ﬁrst variable is the need to
reach some closure (a conclusion as to a knowledge) versus the need to
avoid closure (i.e., “closure seeking” vs. “closure avoiding”). The second
variable pertains to the speciﬁcity versus nonspeciﬁcity of such closure
(i.e., the importance for the individual of reaching either speciﬁc knowl-
edge or any knowledge).
The need to reach nonspeciﬁc closure is particularly interesting for the
question of hypothesis conﬁrmation, as it incites the search for any
response that may help avoid the risk of remaining under uncertainty.
This is especially important in situations where a response must be pro-
vided within a limited amount of time, or when other factors increase
evaluation apprehension (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). For example, situa-
tions in which prestige, status or competence are associated with having
some knowledge (Hass, 1981) represent pervasive external pressures in
everyday life – for instance in school or work settings – which implies
that the need for nonspeciﬁc closure is likely to be highly prevalent.
The theory of lay epistemics distinguishes between two circumstances.
First, the epistemic process is “frozen” when there is a correspondence
between the knowledge one person has and the knowledge this person
wants to achieve (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). This means that the gen-
eration of hypotheses is blocked and the individual will be insensitive to
further information. Second, the epistemic process is “unfrozen” when the
information one has is in conﬂict with the information one wants to
achieve. This stimulates the generation of hypotheses and brings increased
attention to the information that can be relevant to test them. The experi-
ments carried out within this framework (Kruglanski, 1989) have shown
that participants with a high need for nonspeciﬁc closure generate fewer
hypotheses about the problem under evaluation, and show greater conﬁ-
dence in the hypotheses they have generated. Moreover, they form impres-
sions on the basis of ﬁrst information, and base judgments on stereotypes.
This is not the case for participants with a need to avoid closure. These
results are important because they show that conﬁrmation may be a
motivated form of closed-mindedness (Kruglanski, 2013) due to the dis-
positional or the situational need to reach some closure in the process of
knowledge generation.
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Interestingly, work conducted on decision-making shows that conﬁr-
mation may occur because of the very fact that knowledge has been
generated. Frey’s (1986) work on “selective exposure to information”
revealed that once a decision is made, people tend to selectively seek
out information likely to conﬁrm that decision, and avoid any incon-
gruent information. This mechanism is motivated by the need to avoid
cognitive dissonance and reduces the probability that one will be exposed
to new knowledge that may challenge one’s decision. Further research
from the same group showed that conﬁrmatory information seeking also
occurs in group decision-making (Frey & Schulz-Hardt, 2001). Groups
too prefer information that conﬁrms past decisions, and this phenom-
enon is stronger in highly homogenous groups (Schulz-Hardt, Frey,
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). This result illustrates how – like in the
case of need for closure – situational factors may be responsible for a
general tendency in individuals and groups to prefer conﬁrmatory evi-
dence for one’s choices.
Conﬁrmation as a pragmatic strategy
The literature also oﬀers several accounts of conﬁrmation as a pragmatic
strategy. For instance, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) developed a theory that
incorporates the social experience acquired by the individual and the ability
to use inference mechanisms. According to these authors, humans have
developed a set of “pragmatic schemas,” rules that are less abstract than
truth tables in logic (since they are internalised by the experience of certain
social situations), but nevertheless general enough to be applicable to all cases
having the same form (which the authors call “domain-speciﬁc compe-
tences”). For example, resolving the task that requires checking the rule “if
a person drinks beer, then he/she must be over eighteen” (see above) does not
depend on knowledge of the particular case of underage people drinking
beer, but on the fact that the participant can confront this speciﬁc situation to
a set of rules that apply to the category of “permissions” (Cheng & Holyoak,
1985; Light, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 1990). Thus, according to this theory, the
ability of people to solve reasoning problems, and to use disconﬁrmation,
does not depend on the diﬃculty of the task, but rather on the extent to which
linguistic and conversational features of the task allow them to apply a
general pragmatic scheme. A similar point has been made by Cosmides
(1989), although this author argues that the domain-speciﬁc competencies
are determined by phylogenesis: If disconﬁrming evidence corresponds to
cues that a cheater is trying to obtain a beneﬁt without paying the cost, then
reasoners are motivated to use disconﬁrmation to detect the cheater (see also
Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
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The pragmatics of conversation are also at the core of the “argumentative
theory” (Mercier, 2016; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). According to these
authors, reasoning has evolved to allow conversation, as well as to help in
the production and evaluation of arguments exchanged during communi-
cation. An important feature of this theory is that people are somehow
biased and lazy during the production phase, but process information more
eﬀortfully and diagnostically when they evaluate arguments. In this respect,
conﬁrmation appears to be a feature of, and limited to, the production of
arguments to convince others:
Conviction can hardly be achieved by providing interlocutors with arguments
for their views or against that of the speaker. Argument production should
thus be marked by a strong myside bias (or conﬁrmation bias): people
overwhelmingly produce arguments that support their point of view or attack
that of the interlocutor. (Mercier, 2016, p. 690)
This is an important statement for the argument that we will develop later
in this article: Conﬁrmation may have a function in the regulation of social
relations.
The idea that conﬁrmation of hypotheses may have a pragmatic function
in the regulation of social relations has also been defended by Leyens,
Dardenne, Yzerbyt, Scaillet, and Snyder (1999). These authors explicitly
addressed the social advantages of conﬁrmation in general, while illustrat-
ing them in the domain of expectations in person perception. For example,
in a study by Dardenne and Leyens (1995) participants displayed a pre-
ference for conﬁrmatory information when testing a hypothesis about a
personality trait of a person; however, this eﬀect appeared mostly when
participants were high in social skills and when the target person was high
in status. The authors interpret this result as proof that conﬁrmation can be
a social skill, to the extent that it is important to be cautious (conﬁrmatory)
with a high-status person, and it is indeed what participants high in social
skills do.
Leyens et al. (1999) thus adopt a non-normative approach in which
the productions of reasoners are not compared to what should be
expected according to formal logic, but rather focuses on what reasoners
do as a function of the situational constraints. Since conﬁrmation occurs
in a wealth of situations and for a large number of individuals, these
authors consider that it is the “default option” when testing hypotheses
or expectations. While they recognise that several explanations may
account for the systematic use of conﬁrmation in hypothesis testing,
they do not favour one explanation over the others; they rather claim
that several explanations may interact. They also claim that conﬁrmation
is not necessarily a sign of laziness or failure of the cognitive system:
They reviewed a sizeable body of work showing that people tend to
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memorise consistent evidence (e.g., Kunda, 1990), evaluate the amount
of consistent evidence they possess (Ditto & Lopez, 1992), and actively
try to reconcile consistent and inconsistent information (Yzerbyt, Coull,
& Rocher, 1999). In conclusion, individuals are described as ﬂexible
perceivers who can use either conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation, either
eﬀortfully or eﬀortlessly, depending on the demands of the social
situation.
The role of situational constraints in social interactions is also at the core
of Snyder and Stukas’ (1999) appraisal of behavioural conﬁrmation. A long-
standing line of research has characterised behavioural conﬁrmation as the
process whereby a perceiver’s beliefs about a target inﬂuences his or her
behaviour when interacting with the target (Snyder, 1984). For example, if
the perceiver believes that the target is kind, s/he will behave in a likeable
manner, which will prompt a kind reaction from the target, which in turn
will conﬁrm the perceiver’s belief. This work and that in the general area of
self-fulﬁlling prophecies (Merton, 1948; Rosenthal, 1994) has been synthe-
sised by Snyder and Stukas (1999) to propose a dynamic picture of con-
ﬁrmation in social relations:
The processes of conﬁrmation and disconﬁrmation involve a complex inter-
twining of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral activities in social interac-
tion – a dynamic intertwining in which features of perceivers and targets, of
their motivation and their roles, and of their personal characteristics and their
situational contexts are all integrated into scenarios of mutual and reciprocal
inﬂuence on the processes and outcomes of social interaction. (p. 297)
Conﬁrmation as a coping response in competitive environments
In the above literature review, we have documented how cognitive, motiva-
tional, pragmatic and social factors contribute to the emergence of the
complex and multiform phenomenon of conﬁrmation. We contend, how-
ever, that such a systematic and pervasive phenomenon as conﬁrmation
cannot be reduced to the failure of the cognitive or the motivational system,
nor can it merely serve a generic pragmatic function. On the contrary, it
must be a central mechanism of human activity serving an important and
speciﬁc social function. In this article, we propose that conﬁrmation is an
adaptive mechanism that serves the function of coping with competitive
situations. Indeed, because competition threatens one’s feelings of compe-
tence, searching for consistent, self-conﬁrmatory information may be reas-
suring. This general proposition will be broken down into three
implications, of increasing levels of speciﬁcation, that will be illustrated
by a set of older and more recent studies from our research group:
Conﬁrmation occurs to a larger extent (1) when there is competition, (2)
when competition is threatening, and (3) when competition threatens one’s
feelings of competence.
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Implication 1: Conﬁrmation occurs especially when there is
competition
If it is true that conﬁrmation serves the function of coping with competi-
tion, it should be found that conﬁrmation occurs especially in competitive
environments.
Conﬁrmation in competitive vs. cooperative environments
The ﬁrst study that will be presented addresses the question of whether
conﬁrmation is more likely to occur in competitive than in cooperative
environments. In this study (Toma & Butera, 2009, Experiment 1), 90
French psychology students were asked to solve a mystery (a road accident)
in groups of three freely interacting participants. Participants read a set of
clues and discussed as a group of three people in order to ﬁnd the best
solution (see below). Competition was induced through the structural
features of the group work: The group was asked to discuss the case
together and was told that
although in group decision situations members generally make a joint deci-
sion, it is often important to be the ﬁrst in the group to propose a solution.
Thus, their goal was to outperform the others by being the ﬁrst in the group
to oﬀer the best solution. (Toma & Butera, 2009, p. 797)
This competition condition was contrasted with a cooperation condition in
which participants were asked to reach a joint decision that they would
have to announce collectively when they all agreed with it. In other words,
competition and cooperation were manipulated by creating either negative
or positive goal interdependence, respectively (Deutsch, 1973).
The information about the accident was distributed following a “hidden-
proﬁle” scheme (Stasser & Titus, 1985): Groups were given two sets of
information (see Table 1), one that was shared across the three group
members, and one that was unshared (i.e., unique to each group member).
Unshared pieces of information were designed to point to a certain char-
acter as the guilty person in the scenario (Mr X, Mrs Y or Mr Z), and each
piece was distributed to a diﬀerent group member (i.e., participant A
received the unshared information suggesting that the culprit was Mr X;
participant B received the unshared information suggesting that the culprit
was Mrs Y, . . .). And, indeed, pilot testing showed that participants
endorsed the initial preference suggested in the unshared information by
choosing the intended guilty person (Toma & Butera, 2009, appendix). The
important question is whether participants use the unshared information to
disconﬁrm their initial preference and to reach the correct solution. In
other words, will participants remain stuck to their initial preferences
(and will they tend to conﬁrm them), or will they be able to use the
available disconﬁrming information?
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As illustrated in Figure 1, participants in the competition condition
(15 groups) engaged in less disconﬁrmation than those in the coopera-
tion condition (15 groups); that is, they were less likely to use the
available information to test the limits of their initial preference,
which therefore remained unquestioned. This result was replicated in
the second experiment of the same article (also shown in Figure 1):
Again, participants in the competition condition (14 groups) engaged
in less disconﬁrmation than those in the cooperation condition (14
groups). To summarise, these ﬁrst two experiments suggest that parti-
cipants in a competitive (vs. cooperative) group structure were less
susceptible to question their initial preference. This is an important
preliminary piece of the puzzle, to the extent that conﬁrmation was
described as the inability to consider alternative hypotheses; these
results show that the problem might not be the participant’s inability
to disconﬁrm but rather disconﬁrmation’s lack of functionality in a
negatively (vs. positively) interdependent group structure.
Conﬁrmation or mere diﬀerentiation?
One possible alternative interpretation of the results presented above is that
conﬁrmation may be a way to assert one’s own speciﬁc position in situations
where diversity is present. Competition would then be merely an accentuat-
ing factor that makes it clear that diﬀerences in points of view, or solutions,
are important. This interpretation is plausible and in line with the work on
diﬀerentiation by Lemaine (1974), which has revealed that people are moti-
vated to feel unique. One way to achieve this goal is to express judgments that
Table 1. The hidden proﬁle task (adapted from Toma & Butera, 2009, Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin. Copyright by Sage).
Shared information.
The collision takes place at the St. Georges intersection, on Monday at 7 p.m. The road is narrow and
poorly lit. Two cars and one motorcycle are involved. In the ﬁrst car, Mr. X, who is 53 years old and
has held a driving licence for 30 years–and his seventeen-year-old son4 – return home. The father
had just drunk several glasses of spirits during a dinner with his friends. In the second car, Mrs. Y,
27 years old and having held a driving licence for only one year, is going shopping. Her car’s
lights are damaged. On the motorcycle, Mr. Z, 28 years old, who has held a driving licence for
5 years, is going to meet his sick father who asked him to come rapidly. He is speeding on the
N13 road.
Unshared information.
To member 1, suggesting that the guilty person is Mr X. The guilty person is driving a car. During
police inspection, the guilty car owner was discovered to have a 1.5 level of alcohol. The guilty
person admits that he was inattentive at the time of the collision.
To member 2, suggesting that the guilty person is Mrs Y. The guilty person is less than 30 years old.
Due to inexperience, the guilty person wasn’t able to avoid the collision. The guilty person claims
that he/she did not see others approaching the intersection.
To member 3, suggesting that the guilty person is Mr Z: The guilty person is a man. His father is
indirectly responsible for the accident. The guilty person was driving at 110 km/h.
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make diﬀerences with others apparent (Lemaine, 1975). Thus, is conﬁrma-
tion driven by competition or simply by dissent?
In two experiments (N = 80 and N = 120), Toma, Gilles, and Butera
(2013a) asked French and Belgian university students to work on the same
car-accident case described in the previous section, but this time without
real interaction: Thanks to a role-play procedure, they were asked to
imagine that they were police inspectors required to interact with two
other team members in the case. Competition and cooperation were
again induced through negative and positive interdependence (a promising
promotion for one of them vs. for the team). In Experiment 2, a control
condition without goal instructions was also introduced, but we will not
report it here in order to facilitate the comparison between the two experi-
ments. A second independent variable was then introduced: In the dissent
condition, participants were given the hypothesis formulated by the two
other group members (Mrs Y and Mr Z; the participant was always oriented
to think that Mr X was responsible for the accident), whereas in the no
dissent condition, the others’ solutions were not provided.
In this study, conﬁrmation was operationalised through a measure of
“preference for consistent information” (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003):
After having studied the case, participants were given six supplementary pieces
of information, three of them consistent with their initial preference and three
of them inconsistent. As their initial preference was Mr X, an example of
consistent information was that “the person responsible for the accident is a
man”, whereas an example of inconsistent information was that “the person



































Figure 1. Number of disconﬁrmations (statements in which a member ruled out any
initial preference) per condition, in Experiments 1 and 2 (based on Toma & Butera,
2009). The main eﬀect of cooperation-competition was F(1, 28) = 6.76, p < .05,
ηp
2 = .19 in Experiment 1, and F(1, 26) = 12.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33 in Experiment 2.
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Participants were then asked to rate on a 9-point scale the extent to
which each of these items was important for reaching the optimal decision.
Preference for consistent information consisted of a score in which the
ratings of the inconsistent information were subtracted from the ratings of
the consistent information; this score indicates the degree to which parti-
cipants evaluated information so as to conﬁrm their initial preference
(Toma et al., 2013a).
In both experiments, the analyses revealed an interaction between com-
petition (vs. cooperation) and dissent (vs. no dissent): Participants mani-
fested a stronger preference for conﬁrmatory items under competition than
under cooperation, to the extent that their initial solution was diﬀerent (vs.
not) from that of the other two ﬁctitious members. Both experiments
showed that when there was dissent, the preference score was positive in
the competition condition (i.e., a preference for consistent over inconsistent
items), whereas the score was negative in the cooperation condition (i.e.,
which refers to a preference for inconsistent over consistent items). This
suggests that participants’ behaviour is logically rational in the cooperative
condition, as they use disconﬁrmation as a diagnostic strategy that leads to
the elimination of sub-optimal hypotheses. When participants compete
with the other team members, they prefer conﬁrmatory items, even if
their diagnostic value is lower.
In this study, the authors also coded the degree to which – beyond the
expressed preference – the ﬁnal choice of participants reﬂected a conﬁrma-
tory decision. The authors coded whether the participants’ ﬁnal decision
identiﬁed the same culprit that they had picked before receiving the sup-
plementary information. As can be seen in Figure 2, the results again
revealed an interaction, showing a stronger conﬁrmatory behaviour in
competitive (vs. cooperative) settings, a diﬀerence that was larger when
dissent was present (vs. absent). Thus, these two experiments allow us to
understand that dissent per se is not responsible for increased use of
conﬁrmation: Dissent resulted in a stronger preference for conﬁrmation
and more conﬁrmatory decisions when participants were in competition,
whereas dissent in a cooperative context showed that the initial suboptimal
decision needed to be abandoned. Competition leads to conﬁrmation when
people need to assert the superiority of their own solution over those of
their competitors.
Conﬁrmation and self-other judgments
It may be argued that conﬁrmation is a pervasive phenomenon because it is
an instance of a more general and equally pervasive phenomenon known as
self-other bias, whereby judgments regarding the self are more positive than
those regarding others (Brown, 1986). This idea would amount to the claim
that people stick to their own hypotheses because of a general tendency to
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favour one’s own ideas. The results of Toma, Bry and Butera’s (2013b)
study allow us to study the generic pervasiveness versus situational emer-
gence of these two phenomena.
The procedure of this experiment introduced the same task used in Toma
et al. (2013a). Participants, 50 Swiss university students, were again asked to
imagine solving an accident case in a team of police oﬃcers who would be
promoted, in the case of success, either individually (competition) or as a team
(cooperation). This time, however, they were asked to rate, on a 9-point scale,
the importance of nine, instead of six, supplementary pieces of information, in
order to assess the participants’ judgment toward (a) three items referring to
consistent and (b) three items referring to inconsistent information that the
teammembers possess, but also (c) three items related to information they had
from the beginning (own information). The latter information was provided to
study the “ownership bias” (Chernyshenko,Miner, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2003;
see also the “myside bias”, Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013), a self-other bias
whereby group members value their own information more than that of the
others. As in the research presented above, the results showed that competition
led to more positive evaluation of conﬁrmatory information and less positive
evaluation of disconﬁrmatory information than cooperation. Moreover, parti-
cipants also rated their own information more positively when working under
competition than cooperation, ηp
2 = .25 (see Table 2). It then appears that
preference for conﬁrmation and preference for own information are two
distinct phenomena that vary as a function of the negative versus positive
interdependence that binds group members. Thus, preference for conﬁrma-
tion and preference for own information occur when people know that they
will be assessed via a competitive comparison with other group members.
Competitive structures, norms and goals
In the above work, competition was structurally induced through negative
interdependence (Toma & Butera, 2015), but it is reasonable to assume that
other factors inducing or implying competition should play the same role.
This is an important assumption as it would explain why conﬁrmation is so
often found in laboratory experiments, where competition can be prompted
by the presence of co-actors or even mere normative evaluation (an experi-
ment is evaluative in nature).
Table 2. Mean evaluation of own and other’s information in cooperation and competi-
tion (Adapted from Toma et al., 2013b). Standard deviations in parentheses.
Own Other’s consistent Other’s inconsistent
Cooperation 6.23 (1.25) 4.57 (1.74) 5.75 (1.54)
Competition 7.33 (1.36) 6.00 (1.76) 4.76 (1.58)
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One important source of competition is the presence of a graded assess-
ment in a task. Indeed, from the beginning of school life, pupils understand
that grades come with two important features: They make performance
visible and they aﬀord an easy tool for social comparison and diﬀerentia-
tion (Pulfrey, Darnon, & Butera, 2013). Pupils, then students, then workers
thus realise that a high grade is a scarce reward and that their classmates or
workmates are competitors in the race to obtain such a reward. This
explains why grades are often conceived of as norm-based (or normative)
assessment (Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera, 2011). In a set of two experiments,
Hayek, Toma, Oberlé, and Butera (2015) studied the relation between
grading and conﬁrmation. They used the same research paradigm set out
by Toma et al. (2013a) and measured the preference for conﬁrmatory
information, which in this paradigm is computed by subtracting consistent
from inconsistent information. In both experiments (N = 162, N = 96, both
with Swiss students), they contrasted a condition where participants
expected a grade with other conditions without grades. They showed that
preference for conﬁrmatory information was higher in the graded condi-
tion. In other words, conﬁrmation rises when a competitive environment is
hinted by grades, an evaluative tool that is most often associated with the
situational need to distinguish oneself positively in comparison with others.
The dispositional need to distinguish oneself positively in comparison
with others has also been found to be associated with some forms of
conﬁrmation. Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, and Butera (2006)
measured a set of achievement goals: Mastery goals (the desire to learn)
and performance goals (the desire to outperform others1; Elliot &
McGregor, 2001). The authors asked their participants, 51 French psychol-
ogy students, to imagine a debate with a disagreeing partner, and then
assessed the extent to which participants intended to regulate such a
disagreement in an epistemic way (focusing on the knowledge involved in
the task) and in a relational way (trying to show that one was right and the
partner was wrong; Butera, Darnon, & Mugny, 2011). Participants indicated
to what extent, from 1 to 7, when disagreement occurred they tried to
“think about the text again in order to understand better”, “examine the
conditions under which each point of view could help you understand”,
“think of a solution that could integrate both points of view” (epistemic
regulation), “resist by maintaining your initial position”, “show your part-
ner was wrong”, and “show you were right” (relational regulation). The
1It is important to note that performance goals have been divided into performance-approach goals
(the desire to outperform others) and performance-avoidance goals (the desire not to be out-
performed by others; e.g., Elliot & McGregor, 2001). In this article, we focus on competition and
competitive goals; we are therefore concerned with performance-approach goals. However, to
increase readability and ﬂuency, we will use the term “performance goals” to refer to “perfor-
mance-approach goals”, i.e., competitive goals.
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measure of relational regulation is particularly interesting here because it
captures what conﬁrmation entails: One’s hypothesis is right and if a
conﬂicting hypothesis is formulated, this must be wrong. Results revealed
a correlation showing that the higher the competitive goals of outperform-
ing others, the stronger the will to regulate the dissent in relational way (i.e.,
in a self-conﬁrmatory way), r(51) = .51.
A few years later, Sommet et al. (2014, Study 1) found the same relation-
ship, but this time with a behavioural measure. In this study, 36 Swiss
educational sciences students worked in dyads, and were asked to debate
human memory, with each member reading a diﬀerent text: One text
referred to the primacy eﬀect (the ﬁrst elements of a series are better
remembered than the following ones), whereas the other text referred to
the recency eﬀect (the last elements of a series are better remembered than
the previous ones). Although both eﬀects exist, they seem contradictory,
and a debate with these two standpoints is bound to be conﬂictual. At the
end of the debate, participants were asked to evaluate four graphs on a 7-
point scale:
The graphs represented four possible relationships between ‘the position of a
word’ and ‘the probability of recall’: (1) A decreasing curve (corresponding to
the primacy eﬀect); (2) An increasing curve (corresponding to the recency
eﬀect); (3) A U-shaped curve (corresponding to the serial position eﬀect); and
(4) An inverse U-shaped curve (corresponding to an incorrect alternative
answer). (p. 138)
The results showed that the higher the participants’ scores on performance
goals, the more positive the evaluation of the model corresponding to their
initial position, β = .43: A decreasing curve if they had studied the primacy
eﬀect and an increasing curve if they had studied the recency eﬀect. In
other words, self-set competitive goals predicted a conﬁrmatory choice.
Summary
We proposed that conﬁrmation is an adaptive mechanism allowing people
to cope with their threatened feelings of competence in case of competition.
In this section, we evaluated the ﬁrst implication of this proposition,
namely that if the proposition is true, conﬁrmation should appear to a
larger extent in competitive settings. The studies presented above provide
strong support for this implication, as all of them showed that conﬁrmation
was stronger when participants worked in a group where members were
tied by negative rather than positive goal interdependence. This was true
when participants actually worked in a group and when they imagined
working in a team. It was true with diﬀerent measures of conﬁrmation, be
they the lack of use of information that may disconﬁrm one’s initial
decision, the preference for information that was consistent with one’s
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initial decision, or ﬁnal decisions that were identical to the initial ones. And
the eﬀect generalised to competition induced by cultural norms – the
presence of graded evaluation – and self-set competitive goals. If conﬁrma-
tion is indeed a pervasive phenomenon, it might be because competition is
pervasive, at least in capitalist countries (Schwartz, 2007).
Implication 2: Conﬁrmation occurs especially when competition is
threatening
If it is true that conﬁrmation has the function of helping us to cope with
competition, it should be found that conﬁrmation occurs especially when
competition is threatening. Competition is not always threatening, only
when one is likely to lose. Indeed, competition is a source of stress that
can be appraised in two diﬀerent ways, either as a challenge or as a threat
(e.g., Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993). Appraisal will follow the
challenge path when one expects that available resources (material or
symbolic) will exceed the demands (in the case of competition, when one
expects to win). Conversely, appraisal will follow the threat path when one
expects that the demands will exceed available resources (e.g., when one
expects to lose). Therefore, when people are involved in a confrontation in
which they are weaker and may expect to lose, they are likely to feel
threatened and conﬁrmation should appear to a greater extent than when
people do not feel threatened.
Before we move forward and present the relevant research, a question
remains: What is threat? Butera and Darnon (2017) have recently discussed
this question that often arises in research dealing with self-evaluation:
Drawing on research by Tesser (1988), Steele (1988), and Muller and
Butera (2007), they explained that threat is the outcome of failure to
reach the expected or hoped-for self-evaluation. This conception of threat
is particularly relevant for the present discussion of the threatening poten-
tial of competition when some inferiority is expected: Competition with
upward sources signals a high probability of losing and is therefore threa-
tening. This is consistent with Muller and Fayant’s (2010) review showing
that upward comparison with a dissimilar or hard-to-reach source is indeed
threatening for self-esteem, social desirability, self-eﬃcacy and other impor-
tant features of the self. This conception of threat is also interesting because
it implies that the elicitation of threat may be measured not only through
physiological measures (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-
Bell, 2001), but also through the regulatory mechanisms that threat pro-
duces (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). Conﬁrmation, as argued in the
present article, is one such mechanism.
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Threatening inﬂuence sources
Let us begin with the case of a social comparison that is threatening
because one is confronted with a majority. In a series of three experi-
ments (N = 93, N = 156, N = 155), Legrenzi, Butera, Mugny, and Pérez
(1991), Butera and Mugny (1992), and Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi, and
Pérez (1996) asked their participants (Swiss university and high-school
students) to solve a set of inductive reasoning problems akin to the 2-4-6
task presented above (Wason, 1960). As in the original task, after they
were given the triad 2-4-6, participants were to (a) formulate a hypoth-
esis as per the rule that generated this triad and (b) test this hypothesis
by proposing a new triad. Remember, that in this task people display a
strong tendency to use conﬁrmation (Butera & Mugny, 2001). The task
devised in these three experiments, however, was embedded in a social
inﬂuence setting, to study if hypothesis conﬁrmation appeared system-
atically or if it appeared as a function of the inﬂuence source. Before
writing down their answer (i.e., formulating a hypothesis and testing it),
participants were informed about the answer given by an inﬂuence
source. Speciﬁcally, they were given the answer allegedly proposed by a
majority or a minority of previous participants. This manipulation of
numerical support is particularly relevant to the question of whether
conﬁrmation occurs especially when people are confronted with a threa-
tening source. In an inﬂuential article, Nemeth (1986) argued and
showed that being confronted to a majority is particularly threatening
because people hold heuristic beliefs regarding numerical support, in
particular, that majorities are generally right (see also De Vries, De
Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996), which is not the case if the inﬂu-
ence source is a minority.
In Figure 3 we report the mean proportion of conﬁrmation in
hypothesis testing in the aforementioned three experiments. It is the
mean proportion because in each experiment participants had to solve
two problems of the same type. Although these experiments also
included other independent variables (see the original articles), we only
report the diﬀerence between the majority and minority conditions,
which are the focus in this section. Results showed that the proportion
of conﬁrmatory testing was higher when participants were confronted
with a majority than a minority, a diﬀerence that was signiﬁcant in the
three experiments. In sum, a more threatening inﬂuence source (a
majority), elicited a higher proportion of conﬁrmation than a less threa-
tening source (a minority).
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Threatening social comparison
Another case of threatening confrontation is when competition takes place
with a superior other. Sommet, Darnon and Butera (2015, Experiment 1)
measured their participants’ competitive goals (with the three items of the
performance goals scale, as in Sommet et al., 2014, presented above) and
then provided their participants with a text on either the primacy or the
recency eﬀect. The study was conducted on the Internet: The 139 partici-
pants, all Swiss university students, were contacted by email and invited to
participate in an online study on collaborative e-learning. As in Sommet
et al. (2014), they received the seemingly contradictory answer of a bogus
student who explained the opposite eﬀect (respectively, either the recency
or the primacy eﬀect). Importantly, the other student’s status was manipu-
lated to be either the same as the participant (same grade level) or superior
(higher grade level). Finally, participants were given a series of items to
assess how they regulated the conﬂict with the partner, among which three
self-conﬁrmation items: To what extent “did you try to show you were
right?”, “did you try to show your partner was wrong?”, and “did you try to
resist by maintaining your initial position?”, on a 7-point scale The results
showed that the performance goals score positively predicted conﬁrmatory
conﬂict regulation when the partner was higher, but not when similar, in
status (see Figure 4). Thus, self-set competitive goals resulted in higher self-
conﬁrmation especially when participants were led to compare themselves































 Superior status partner 
Same status partner 
Figure 4. Conﬁrmatory conﬂict regulation as a function of self-set performance goals
(From Sommet et al., 2015, Experiment 1. Journal of Educational Psychology. Copyright
by the American Psychological Association). The interaction eﬀect was, β = .19, F(1,
129) = 4.38, p < .04, η2p = .03.
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 321
In another study with 73 French vocational school students, Sommet
et al. (2015, Study 2) tested whether the same eﬀect could be obtained with
manipulated competitive goals and with a measure of behavioural conﬁr-
mation. They ﬁrst induced competitive goals, namely performance goals
through instructions. Then, they provided their participants with a text on
either the primacy or the recency eﬀect, and with the alleged opinion of
another student who explained the opposite eﬀect. The other student’s
status was again manipulated to be either the same or superior. Finally,
the participants had to rate two curves that corresponded to the partici-
pant’s theory (either recency or primacy) and to the other student’s theory
(as in Sommet et al., 2014, presented above). A preference for the con-
ﬁrmatory model was then computed, by subtracting the evaluation of the
model (the curve) patterning the other student’s theory from the evaluation
of the model patterning the participant’s. The results showed that if per-
formance goals had been induced the preference for the conﬁrmatory
model was higher when confronted to a superior rather than a same-level
partner. These results bring convergent support to implication 2, in that
they show that conﬁrmation increases with the presence of situational
competitive goals and confrontation with a threatening other.
Reducing threat
We argued that the presence of a superior other is threatening in a
competitive situation because it prompts the possibility of losing. If this is
true, when such a possibility is removed, threat should be reduced and the
use of conﬁrmation limited. This is what Butera and Mugny (2001) found.
In their ﬁnal experiment, with 111 Swiss high-school students, these
authors asked the participants to solve an inductive reasoning task, while
being confronted with a disagreeing other who was presented as high in
competence. Two variables were manipulated. The ﬁrst induced either
negative interdependence of evaluation or independence1995, thereby
creating vs. defusing competition. The second variable manipulated com-
plementarity of points of view. Half of the participants were confronted
with a task that made salient vs. not the usefulness of complementarity of
points of view (Huguet, Mugny, & Pérez, 1991): Participants were shown
that people beneﬁt from trying to integrate seemingly inconsistent points of
view, because reality may be more complex than it seems. The dependent
variable assessed to what extent the participant’s hypothesis was tested with
conﬁrmatory or disconﬁrmatory examples.
Let us discuss to what extent the results of this experiment enlighten the
question of the reduction of threat and conﬁrmation. The main eﬀect of
negative interdependence of evaluation vs. independence revealed a lower
proportion of conﬁrmation responses when competition was defused by
independence. This is consistent with our assumption, in that it is less
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threatening to disagree with a competent partner when there is not (vs.
there is) competition; and indeed it is in this situation that conﬁrmation is
reduced. The main eﬀect of complementarity (vs. not) of points of view
revealed a lower proportion of conﬁrmation when it was made clear that
people beneﬁt from integrating seemingly inconsistent points of view. This
is also consistent with our assumption, in that it is less threatening to
disagree with a competent partner when there is (vs. is not) the possibility
that both points of view are part of a more complex reality. Thus, removing
the possibility of losing, or reducing its relevance, made it possible to
reduce the occurrence of conﬁrmation.
Summary
In this section, we evaluated the second implication of our general proposi-
tion, namely that, if it is true that conﬁrmation is an adaptive mechanism
intended to help coping with threatened feelings of competence in case of
competition, then conﬁrmation should occur to a larger extent when
competition is threatening. The studies presented above bring convergent
support to this implication. Conﬁrmation was higher when social compar-
ison was unfavourable, either because participants were confronted with a
majority or because competition took place with a superior other.
It is important to note that social comparison does not need to provide
the certainty of losing in order to be threatening: Research has shown that
merely doubting one’s standing is suﬃcient (Muller & Butera, 2007), which
might explain why conﬁrmation has occurred for decades when partici-
pants worked on reasoning task in which social comparison was not
explicitly manipulated but in which there was the possibility of not meeting
some standard.
It is also important to note that threat comes from social comparison
with a potential competitor in the social space (a schoolmate, a colleague, a
fellow participant in an experiment, etc.). This note is important because
one might argue that, as reported above, Cosmides (1989) has shown that
when participants try to detect cheaters, the disconﬁrmation rate increases,
and cheaters are arguably potential competitors. However, in the work
conducted by Cosmides (1989), cheaters are characters in a vignette. In
other words, they are part of the task and not a social comparison target.
This remark also applies to research showing that distrust increases the use
of disconﬁrmatory strategies in rule discovery (Mayo, 2015). Indeed, it
could be argued that competitors are sources of distrust to the extent that
they hold negatively interdependent goals in relation to the reasoner.
However, in this line of research distrust was unrelated to the reasoning
task: It was either measured by a scale explicitly unrelated to the reasoning
task (Mayo, Alfasi, & Schwarz, 2014, Study 1), or primed by an untrust-
worthy face explicitly unrelated to the reasoning task (Mayo et al., 2014,
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Study 2), or primed by ﬁshy smells (Lee, Kim, & Schwarz, 2015). Again, the
source of distrust was not a social comparison target.
Implication 3: Conﬁrmation occurs especially when one’s competence
is threatened
If it is true that conﬁrmation has the function of coping with competition, it
should be found that conﬁrmation occurs especially when competition is
threatening for one’s feelings of competence. Why do we need to diﬀer-
entiate implication 2 and implication 3? Is it not suﬃcient to state that
conﬁrmation occurs when competition is threatening (implication 2)? What
is the added value of implication 3 and the speciﬁcation that conﬁrmation
occurs when competition threatens one’s competence? We believe that this
distinction is important, based on an abundant literature that points to the
various areas of human life that can be threatened, besides competence.
First, threat may arise in areas of human life that are not directly
concerned with self-concept, like for instance safety (e.g., Lynch, Plant, &
Ryan, 2005) or existential concerns (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski,
1997). Second, some authors have studied threat to the self without further
speciﬁcations (e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002), whereas others have speciﬁed
which self-related construct was concerned by threat, as in work on control
threats (e.g., Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010), self-certainty threats
(e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999), or threats to meaning (e.g., Heine, Proulx, &
Vohs, 2006). Third, some authors have pointed out that competence is a
fundamental human need, but so are relatedness and autonomy (Ryan &
Deci, 2000a), two human needs that can also be threatened (Ryan & Deci,
2000b). In sum, it appears important to discuss competence threat as a
distinct construct.
Competence threat
Let us start by considering how competence may be threatened by competition.
Self-evaluation threat theory (Muller & Butera, 2007) argues that some threat to
self-evaluation occurs whenever one’s competence does not meet the standards.
Competence assessment is one of the most fundamental motivations in human
activity, and social comparison is the tool that aﬀords information about stan-
dards that may help in self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954). Standards may be
persons, groups, reputations, rankings . . . in sum, any clue about levels of
competence that may aﬀord comparative information (Butera & Darnon,
2017). When such comparative information reveals that one’s competence is
(or may be) below some relevant standard, self-evaluation is threatened. Threat
to self-evaluation manifests itself by a focusing eﬀect, that is, more attention is
allocated to central cues than to peripheral cues (Muller & Butera, 2007). Social
comparison per se consumes attentional resources and creates a distraction that
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limits attention to the central features of a task. Going further, Muller and Butera
(2007) showed that this is the case when social comparison does not allow a
person to fulﬁl their motivation to achieve a positive evaluation of their compe-
tence. In short, self-evaluation threat leads one to only consider the most central,
salient, relevant features of a task. From then on, it is arguable that conﬁrmation
is a form of focusing eﬀect, as conﬁrmation limits hypothesis testing to the
features present in the hypothesis, without considering alternative states of
reality. In this section, we propose that the possibility of losing in a competition
threatens one’s feelings of competence, which results in conﬁrmation.
Competence threat and conﬁrmation
Butera and Mugny (1995) conducted a study that helps in the current
discussion, as it manipulated the presence-absence of competition and
measured both competence threat and conﬁrmation of hypotheses. In this
experiment, 69 Swiss high-school students were presented with a series of
inductive reasoning problems, in which they had to test a hypothesis. As in
the study by Butera et al. (1996) presented above, participants were also
informed about the test conducted by an inﬂuence source before being able
to proceed with their own answer. Moreover, once they began the task,
participants were asked to evaluate their competence and that of the other
on a series of four traits (competence, qualiﬁcation, skill, expertise). This
evaluation was either independent (participants evaluated each trait on
separate 100-point scales for oneself and for the other) or negatively inter-
dependent (participants evaluated each trait for oneself and for the other,
but the total had to amount to 100%). The latter induction puts the
participant and the other in a competitive relationship (i.e., what is given
to the other is detracted from oneself). Finally, participants could go on and
test their hypothesis.
Inspection of the points distributed to oneself and the other shows clear
evidence that competition induced competence threat: In the independence
condition, participants attributed a comparable number of points to oneself
and the other (slightly more to oneself, on average around 50 vs. 44, see
Butera & Mugny, 1995), whereas in the negative interdependence condition
participants showed a strongly asymmetrical distribution of points, claim-
ing a clear and indisputable superiority of oneself over the other (on
average around 71 vs. 29; see Figure 5). This is an interesting result as it
corresponds to establishing an extremely favourable downward comparison
with the other, a phenomenon that early research on social comparison
clearly associated with the need to cope with threat (Wills, 1981). Thus, the
competitive structure of the negative interdependence condition resulted in
a distribution of points that reveals the emergence of a competence threat.
The results also showed that in the negative interdependence condition
participants used conﬁrmation to test their hypotheses to a larger extent
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than in the independence condition. To sum up, this experiment showed
that competition resulted in both increased competence threat and
increased use of conﬁrmation.
Expertise and competence threat
Support for these results can be found in more recent research. Toma,
Vasiljevic, Oberlé, and Butera (2013) gave their participants the road
accident case described above (Toma & Butera, 2009). About 144 French
psychology students participated in three-person groups. Cooperation and
competition were manipulated again through positive and negative goal
interdependence. In addition, this study manipulated what has been called
expertise assignment (e.g., Stewart & Stasser, 1995): In each group, partici-
pants were informed (vs. not) that each of them had privileged access to
unique information, thereby attributing speciﬁc competence to each one of
them. Two measures are relevant to the present discussion. The ﬁrst one is
the self-other diﬀerence in perceived competence (the diﬀerence between
the participant’s own estimated competence and that of the others, on 9-
point scales), with a higher score indicating a greater diﬀerentiation in
reported competence in favour of oneself. The second measure is the
proportion of unshared information pooled during group discussion.
Unshared information is important as it contains the elements that may
lead a person to disconﬁrm the sub-optimal initial solutions, and failure to
pool them is bound to impede disconﬁrmation and the discovery of the
correct solution.
Results revealed a stronger self-other diﬀerence in reported competence
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Figure 5. Mean points per trait, allocated to oneself and the other as a function of in
(ter)dependence (based on Butera & Mugny, 1995).
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(vs. without) expertise assignment. Further analyses pointed out that the
eﬀect was especially due to a devaluing of the other’s competence, in a sort
of downward social comparison typical of threatening contexts (Wills,
1981). Thus, competition with assigned experts appears to be particularly
threatening for the self, as compared to the other conditions. Moreover, it
was also found that the proportion of unshared information was lower
when participants worked in a competitive (vs. cooperative) group, with
(vs. without) expertise assignment. And a mediated moderation analysis
showed that this eﬀect was partially mediated by self-other diﬀerence in
perceived competence (see Table 3). Competition led participants with
assigned expertise to exaggerate the other’s inferiority in terms of compe-
tence, which resulted in a reduced proportion of pooling of unshared
information, the kind of information that could lead during group discus-
sion to disconﬁrm suboptimal solutions.
Summary
The third implication, namely that if our proposition is true, then, con-
ﬁrmation should occur to a larger extent when competition is threatening
for one’s feelings of competence, also received support from the reviewed
results. The studies presented in this section suggest that competition is
threatening for one’s feelings of competence and leads to increased use of
conﬁrmation in reasoning and decision-making. When people are threa-
tened with appearing less competent in a competition, they make sure that
their hypothesis, choice or point of view receives the support aﬀorded by
conﬁrmation.
Table 3. Least squares regression results for the mediated moderation model for the
proportion of unshared information (from Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, and Butera, 2013,

















Predictors β t β t β t
Expertise −.08 −.76 .14 1.14 .03 .29
Goals .69 6.93*** −.40 −3.21** .60 5.74**
Expertise X Goals .28 2.83** −.36 −2.87** .17 1.62
Perception of self-other competence −.24 −2.10*
Perception of self-other competence X Goals .18 1.75
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Contributions to the initial questions
The body of research presented in the previous section supports the view
that conﬁrmation occurs especially in a speciﬁc social situation (competi-
tion), with a speciﬁc appraisal of that situation (threat), and because a
speciﬁc trait (competence) is concerned by the threat. These observations
provide support for the claim that conﬁrmation has a speciﬁc social func-
tion: That of coping with the threat of one’s feelings of competence derived
from competition. Competence is an important human need – some even
say that it is one of the three universal psychological needs (Ryan & Deci,
2000a) – and people are highly motivated to protect it (Steele, 1988; Tesser,
1988). Most social interactions are comparative (Festinger, 1954) and eva-
luative (Butera & Darnon, 2017), as people are motivated to achieve a
positive self-evaluation (Muller & Butera, 2007). However, as noted by
Tesser (1988), competence is also a resource that is highly valued in
industrialised societies, in that it refers to the potential contribution of an
individual to the production system, and therefore it is diﬀerentially
rewarded on the basis of a merit principle (Deutsch, 1979). The conse-
quence of both the importance of competence and its centrality in social
rewards is that in most evaluative settings – school, university, work, sports,
etc., where rewards, grades, awards, positions, advancements, medals are at
stake – people view others as potential competitors and, unless they are
clearly reassured as per their superiority, they feel threatened in their
competence. This explains why conﬁrmation is so pervasive: It allows us
to bring consistent support for our judgments, in pervasively competitive
and threatening social encounters.
It should be noted at this point that “consistent support for our judg-
ments” does not mean that conﬁrmation makes us more accurate. One
might argue that our results merely show that people prefer information
that serves their goal. When the goal is to win rather than to be accurate,
they use conﬁrmation to a larger extent. If the goal was to win by being
accurate, competition would reduce conﬁrmation. However, all the tasks
used in our research programme were problem-solving tasks, tasks that
require the participants to discover the correct or the best answer. In this
respect, a problem-solving task implies that in order to win one has to ﬁnd
a correct answer, as in the aforementioned study by Toma and Butera
(2009) where the goal was to outperform the others by being the ﬁrst in
the group to oﬀer the best solution. The results presented above revealed
that in competitive situations, participants prefer the soothing attempt to
conﬁrm their hypothesis rather than the discovery of the correct answer.
Let us now discuss how our conclusions, and the work that has
prompted them, may contribute to the questions formulated in the ﬁrst
section of this article.
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Is conﬁrmation the result of cognitive failure?
The research discussed in this article shows that the prevalence of con-
ﬁrmation use can be reduced without changing the nature of the task, or
providing speciﬁc training, or making it easier. We showed that the use of
conﬁrmation diminished in cooperative environments (e.g., Toma &
Butera, 2009) and in the case of a comparison with a non-threatening
other (e.g., Sommet et al., 2015), while the task was not altered. Thus,
conﬁrmation cannot be considered the mere result of some cognitive failure
or limitation, as its occurrence is reduced when it is less needed to cope
with a competitive environment that threatens one’s competence. It is
indeed a cognitive process that interacts with motivational, social and
societal factors.
The present results are compatible with the theory of mental models,
which implies that conﬁrmation is more likely to appear than disconﬁrma-
tion because it requires building one mental model instead of several
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Indeed, building several mental models requires a
greater share of cognitive resources than building only one. However,
pursuing competitive goals also taxes cognitive resources, as shown by a
study in which instructions to pursue performance goals (vs. not) depleted
the working memory necessary for the task (Crouzevialle & Butera, 2013;
see also, 2017). Therefore, reducing the distracting eﬀect of competition
may make cognitive resources available for building more complex series of
mental models, and allow problem-solvers to envision the alternative
hypotheses necessary to use disconﬁrmation in a diagnostic way. In other
words, the use of disconﬁrmation need not make the task easier but make
the social environment less threatening.
Is conﬁrmation the result of motivational prioritisation?
Motivation is crucial, but it is important to stress the speciﬁc goal that is
pursued when using conﬁrmation. Motivation for cognitive consistency
(Evans, 1982), need for nonspeciﬁc closure (Kruglanski, 1990) and the
motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance (Frey, 1986) are certainly impor-
tant motives and predict the appearance of several forms of conﬁrmatory
behaviour. However, the research discussed in this article reveals the
importance of clearly identifying the speciﬁc goal involved in the use of
conﬁrmation, in order to understand its social function. Cognitive consis-
tency, need for closure and cognitive dissonance are broad motivations that
predict a wide array of behaviours, well beyond conﬁrmation. In this
respect, they do not allow us to specify the function of the target behaviour.
On the contrary, our ﬁndings show that conﬁrmation occurs especially
in a competitive environment, when competition threatens one’s
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competence, which allows us to uncover that conﬁrmation has a speciﬁc
protective function. Stated otherwise, it may very well be that individuals
who set conﬁrmatory tests of their hypotheses, or seek out conﬁrmatory
information for their expectations, are not just motivated by a need for
nonspeciﬁc closure to stop hypothesis generation and testing, but rather by
the need for the speciﬁc closure (Kruglanski, 1990) to provide the self with
a conﬁrmatory buﬀer against the danger of a potentially negative evaluation
of one’s competence. Likewise, selective exposure to information might be
motivated by a more speciﬁc desire than that of reducing the generic
discomfort following dissonance, namely the desire to protect one’s
competence.
Is conﬁrmation a pragmatic strategy?
Yes, it is, but not a generic strategy. We have seen that in the argumentative
theory (Mercier, 2016) reasoning is viewed as the cognitive function that
allows communication, and conﬁrmation as a strategy that allows people to
produce self-serving arguments during communication. The research pre-
sented in this article, however, showed that conﬁrmation does not appear in
every conversation or in any form of communication: It appears especially
in competitive encounters, and when competence is threatened by the
possibility of losing the argument. In sum, we recognise that conﬁrmation
is a motivated cognitive process and that it is used to achieve a social
function during communication, but our results revealed that both motiva-
tion and social function need to be speciﬁed. Conﬁrmation proceeds from
the speciﬁc need to cope with threatening competitive settings and has the
speciﬁc function of coping with the threat to one’s feelings of competence.
Limitations and research agenda
The present article has articulated a substantial number of studies, spanning
more than 25 years, yet still so much is left to do. The ﬁrst limitation we
need to highlight is an important one. We claimed that the function of
conﬁrmation needed to be a speciﬁc one, and this is why we proposed that
conﬁrmation is an adaptive mechanism allowing one to cope with one’s
threatened feelings of competence in case of competition. This is indeed a
speciﬁc proposition, especially in comparison with other existing accounts,
but it contains an element of indecision: “coping” is a non-speciﬁc reaction.
We would have preferred to be able to clarify whether coping takes the
form of self-enhancement or self-protection, namely “interests that people
have in advancing one or more self-components or defending themselves
against negative self-views” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). However, the pre-
sent results do not allow us to decide, as we have observed both
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phenomena. In Butera and Mugny (1995) and Sommet et al. (2015), con-
ﬁrmation appears to serve a self-enhancement purpose, as it proceeds from
the assertion of one’s own point of view against that of another. In Butera
et al. (1996), it appears to serve a self-protection purpose, as the largest
proportion of conﬁrmation occurs in the condition where participants have
also followed the most the inﬂuence source’s rule (these results were not
reported here but are available in the original article). In a way, conﬁrma-
tion protects the consensus achieved with the source.
When can one expect conﬁrmation to serve self-enhancement vs. self-
protection? A possible answer lies in the underlying motives driving people
to use conﬁrmation in competitive situations. Competition is known to
predict two kinds of performance goals – a distinction that we did not
highlight in the present article, but that might be useful at this point –
namely performance-approach and performance-avoidance goals
(Murayama & Elliot, 2012; see Elliot & McGregor, 2001; and footnote 1).
Sommet et al. (2014) have shown that performance-approach goals predict
a form of conﬂict regulation based on self-enhancement, whereas perfor-
mance-avoidance goals predict a form of conﬂict regulation based on self-
protection. It is possible to interpret the possibly self-enhancing function of
conﬁrmation in Butera and Mugny (1995) and Sommet et al. (2015) by
pointing to the fact that, in these studies, disagreement was set from the
beginning and diﬃcult to escape, and competitive motives needed to
enhance one’s point of view. The possibly self-protecting function of con-
ﬁrmation in Butera et al. (1996) might, in turn, be due to the fact that
compliance was possible and competitive motives could be diverted by
consensus with a superior source. Future research would provide a useful
contribution if a study was designed to disentangle the self-enhancing vs.
self-protecting functions of conﬁrmation.
Another important limitation is that the present proposition is limited to
an inter-individual level of analysis (Doise, 1986). However, we have seen
that conﬁrmation also takes place in group decision-making (Frey &
Schulz-Hardt, 2001), and motivations such as need for closure may inter-
vene at the group level and be shaped, as in Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000), by
group homogeneity (Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002).
Interestingly, when studying concurrence-seeking in groups, the group-
think phenomenon, Janis (1972) proposed that homogenous groups
would be more at risk of conﬁrmatory behaviours such as selective expo-
sure to information. He also noted that external threats, such as a compe-
titive environment, might also be an aggravating factor. An important
extension of the present programme would be to move to the intergroup
level of analysis and test the hypothesis that conﬁrmation in group deci-
sion-making is an adaptive mechanism allowing to cope with the group’s
threatened feelings of competence in case of intergroup competition.
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These limitations notwithstanding, the research programme we reviewed
allowed us to propose an account of conﬁrmation that suggests one reason
why this phenomenon is so pervasive, namely that people test their hypoth-
eses in particularly competitive environments and societies that threaten an
extremely important feature of our self: Competence. In this respect, the
proposed account stems from a socio-cognitive approach in social psychol-
ogy (Doise & Mugny, 1984), which considers that cognitive processes are
inﬂuenced by a dense network of motivational, interpersonal, intergroup
and societal factors (Pérez & Mugny, 1996), with inﬂuences that go in both
directions (Butera, Sommet, & Darnon, in press).
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